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Prof. Dr. Robert Feicht, Dipl.-Math. Dipl.-Kfm.

  • Quantitative Methoden in den Wirtschaftswissenschaften
  • Stochastische Prozesse
  • Big Data Analytics
  • Energie und Ressourcen
  • Bildung für nachhaltige Entwicklung

Professor

QM-Beauftragter


Sprechzeiten

Termine können per E-Mail vereinbart werden.


Sortierung:
Monographie
  • Robert Feicht
  • W. Stummer

Complete closed-form solution to a stochastic growth model and corresponding speed of economic recovery. IWQW Discussion Paper Nr. 5.

(2010)

Beitrag in Sammelwerk/Tagungsband
  • Robert Feicht
  • W. Stummer

An explicit non-stationary stochastic growth model.

  • In:
  • La Grandville, Olivier de
  • Chapter 7 of the book: O. de la Grandville (ed.), Economic Growth and Development, Frontiers of Economics and Globalization.

Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Pub Ltd vol. 11 pg. 141-202

(2011)

Zeitschriftenartikel
  • Robert Feicht
  • V. Grimm
  • M. Seebauer

An experimental study of corporate social responsibility through charitable giving in Bertrand markets.

In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (vol. 124) , pg. 88-101

(2016)

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.11.005

We experimentally investigate a Bertrand market with homogenous goods in which sellers can announce the donation of a share of their profits to an existing non-profit organization. In a 2 × 2 design, we vary the credibility of announcements and the efficiency of the contributions to the public fund. We find that sellers’ donations are strictly positive independently of the credibility of the announcements, and their donations are higher if announcements are credible and efficiency is high. However, market outcomes in terms of prices and profits do not differ significantly in any treatment that allows for contributions to a public fund. Analysis of buyer decisions reveals that prices are the main driver of purchase decisions while higher donations only affect purchase decisions when they are credible and price differences are negligible. Our results indicate that under intense competition the possibility of attracting customers through corporate social responsibility activities is limited, although the constant positive level of contributions suggests that norms lead to a certain minimum level of corporate social responsibility.
Zeitschriftenartikel
  • Robert Feicht
  • V. Grimm
  • H. Rau
  • G. Stephan

On the impact of quotas and decision rules in collective bargaining..

In: European Economic Review (vol. 100) , pg. 175-192

(2017)

DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.08.004

We conduct a novel type of multi-person one-shot game that reflects important aspects of collective bargaining. In all treatments a proposer has to divide a pie among herself and two groups of three recipients each. She cannot discriminate within, but across groups. A committee with representatives from one or both groups takes acceptance decisions. In a 2 × 2 design we vary (i) representation in the decision committee (one vs. both groups) and (ii) the decision rule (unanimity vs. majority voting). We find that (i) representation of a group in the committee is crucial for receiving a significant share, (ii) proposals are balanced only if both groups have veto power, (iii) negotiations often fail if the decision environment gives insufficient guidance on what an appropriate proposal is, and (iv) non-binding communication substantially reduces rejection rates and proposer shares.
Zeitschriftenartikel
  • Robert Feicht
  • Jennifer Huber
  • Anna Marquardt

Education for Sustainable Development – approaches by the InnoLab for Sustainability at the European Campus Rottal-Inn.

In: Bavarian Journal of Applied Sciences (Spotlights section) (vol. 5) , pg. 486-493

(2019)

DOI: 10.25929/bjas.v5i1.69